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 Abstract:  Neuroscience affords knowledge that can be leveraged in the ontological valua-
tion of individuals, groups, and species. Sociocultural sentiments, norms, and mores may 
impede embracing such knowledge to revise moral attitudes, ethics, and policies. We argue 
that the practices of neuroethics will be valuable in that they ground ethico-legal discourse 
in (1) naturalistic philosophy; (2) the current epistemological capital of neuroscience; (3) the 
issues, problems, and solutions arising in and from neuroscientifi c research and its applica-
tions; and 4) the use of neurocentric criteria—such as painience—to defi ne and resolve ethical 
decisions regarding attitudes toward and treatment of nonhuman animals. 
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 Neuroscientifi c Advancements and Attendant Responsibilities 
 Neuroscience has enabled considerable opportunities to assess and defi ne mech-
anisms of sensation, cognition, emotions, and behaviors. This has engendered a 
view of neural systems—and their functions—as embodied within organisms in 
environments. Understanding the neural bases of organisms’ ecological interac-
tions has twofold value: fi rst, it fosters insight into the neurocognitive capabilities 
of individual beings and various species, and second, it prompts deeper refl ection 
and more thorough address of what such functions and capacities  mean relative to 
the ways that organisms are regarded and treated.  1  Indeed, history has revealed 
the use of various forms of neurocentric criteria to shape categorical distinctions 
regarding what types of organisms, and which individuals, may claim particular 
social goods.  2,3,4  The scope and pace of contemporary neuroscientifi c advancement(s) 
have only fortifi ed this trend, in part through heuristics that have been infl uential 
to establishing theories of mind.  5,6  These heuristics are paradigmatically valid and 
of value, but it is important to note that a theory of mind can be a powerful tool 
with which to leverage beliefs, values, and behaviors, and with this power comes 
considerable responsibility.  7,8,9,10  
 Much of the information gained from neuroscientifi c research has been derived 
from animal models, and there is building evidence to support that many animal 
species—for example, mammals, several species of vertebrates, and cephalopods—
have nervous systems that are structurally and functionally sophisticated enough 
to sustain relatively complex cognitive processes.  11,12  This challenges long-held 
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ideas about animals’ incapacity for consciousness, feeling pain, and experiencing 
emotions and, more broadly, contests anachronistic, if not wholly dogmatic, philo-
sophical distinctions between humans and animals.  13,14  As the philosopher Fritz 
Jahr has noted, “scientifi c triumphs . . . have taken away the dominant position of 
the human being in the world in general. Philosophy, formerly prescribing leading 
ideals for the natural sciences, now has to build her systems on the basis of scien-
tifi c knowledge  from the natural sciences.”  15  Of course, differing epistemological 
and anthropological positions exist, and there is ongoing debate about the merit of 
specifi c neurocentric criteria as a basis for ontological status and ethical conduct, 
and if—and which—neurocognitive characteristics are (and should be) important 
for the moral and legal treatment of animals. 
 Our position is that a deepening understanding of the ways that nervous systems 
and brains are involved in (or evoke) those characteristics that are valued in individ-
uals, groups, and a species should compel and sustain the ways that the organisms 
that possess such characteristics are regarded and treated. But, we also note that 
embracing such knowledge to revise moral attitudes and the ethics and policies that 
affect nonhuman animals will not be simple or easy, given particular sociocultural 
sentiments, traditions, norms, and mores. We believe that the relatively new fi eld of 
neuroethics will be valuable to address these challenges in that it grounds ethico-legal 
discourse in (1) a naturalistic philosophy; (2) the current epistemological capital 
of neuroscience; (3) the moral issues, problems, and solutions arising in and from 
neuroscientifi c research and its applications; and (4) the use of neurocentric criteria 
to defi ne and resolve ethical questions and decisions.  16,17,18,19,20  
 Painience—A Minimum Neurocentric Criterion 
 The recognition of (certain species of) animals as being sentient as a basis for and 
the establishment of ethical and legal codes for animal welfare  21,22,23  represents 
an explicit departure from arbitrary speciesism, and a noteworthy advancement 
toward the employment of neurocentric criteria. However, despite progress in 
neuroscience and neurotechnology, much remains unknown about the nature 
of sentience—for instance, the shifting defi nitions of “higher” and “lower” 
consciousness, the neurocognitive function(s) of animals, what species of ani-
mals are sentient, and if and what particular properties of sentience should be 
relevant to discern the extent of moral regard and the level of good that should 
be afforded.  24  
 Hence, we propose that an organism’s capacity to feel pain as noxious (injuri-
ous) and explicitly hurtful (that is to say, pain  qua pain, not simply nociception but 
nociperception) represents a minimum criterion on which to base and predicate 
moral consideration and actions.  25,26  But this too, is not without complication. The 
formal defi nition of pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience”  27  
obtains that for an objective neural event to be subjectively experienced as pain 
(and not merely a high-intensity, aversive stimulus), it would necessarily involve 
the qualities of sensation, cognition, and emotion. To be sure, pain is a multidi-
mensional event that is “a sensation in a part of the body . . . and an emotional 
experience.”  28  It has been claimed that animal pain is not as signifi cant as that of 
humans, given that certain areas of the cortex and neural pathways that have been 
shown to be responsible (in humans) for the associative linking of sensations to 
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 We object to this claim for several reasons. First, this position fails to acknowl-
edge the most current perspective(s) regarding the structure-function relationship 
of nervous systems; these can be colloquially summarized using a computer anal-
ogy to posit that the presence of the “wetware” (the neural substrates) is often a 
reliable predictor that the “program” (pain) can and will be executed.  32  This is 
strengthened by comparative studies of mammalian species as anatomical, physi-
ological, and behavioral models of human development, neurophysiology, and 
pain.  33  Perhaps what is more important is the recognition that the experience 
of pain, while involving a number of higher neuroanatomical loci—for example, 
the somatosensory and associative cortices—is also reliant on subcortical struc-
tures, which are engaged as hierarchical networks and contribute to mental 
processes.  34,35,36,37,38  Thus, the second fl aw in arguments that attempt to negate 
the experience and profundity of animal pain is that they tend to attribute the 
function of networked hierarchies of neural structures (if not the whole brain) to 
particular parts—what has been called the “divisional” or mereological fallacy.  39  
 Third, one-to-one representation of neural structure-functional relationships 
between humans and animals need not be present for the occurrence of cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral processes. The networks involved in pain processing 
are not necessarily identical, that is to say, homologous, to those of humans but 
instead may—and often do—function analogously to conjoin distinct neural sub-
strates to obtain the pain event and experience. This speaks in return to the second 
point—namely, that brains are embodied within an organism, and this individual 
neural structure and function gives rise to differing subjective experiences. 
 To reiterate, although the phenomenology of pain cannot be objectively mea-
sured in animals—including the human animal  40,41  —the presence and activity 
of physiological systems shown to process painful stimuli can lead to strong 
inference(s) regarding accompanying and resultant unpleasant emotional experi-
ence. So, although it is possible, and in some cases likely, that the perception and 
meaning of animal pain is different from that of humans (given distinctions in 
ecology, lived body, and lifeworld), it is important to acknowledge that neural 
systems are in place and operational that allow many animal species to experience 
such stimuli as noxious, and this noxiousness is fundamental to the cognitive-
emotional event and hurtful nature of pain. 
 But, at present, we cannot know the phenomenological characteristics of ani-
mal pain, and although an understanding of various organisms’ nervous systems’ 
capacity to subtend pain is necessary and important, argument by analogy could 
also support the value and use of behavioral expressions—such as increased 
vocalizations, agitation, writhing, reluctance to move and decreased locomo-
tion, attending to and guarding parts of the body, and huddled postures—as 
indicative of pain.  42  In mammals, such behaviors have been shown to repre-
sent more than merely “pseudoaffective” responses and are now regarded as 
manifestations of cognitive and emotional processes, abstract dimensions of fear, 
and (some form of) suffering.  43,44,45  
 However, attending, guarding, and writhing responses have also been iden-
tifi ed in crustaceans, certain insects, and other invertebrates.  46,47  Additionally, 
it has been shown that these creatures have nocisponsive nerve endings, spe-
cialized nociceptors, and neural pathways to subserve high-intensity noxious 
stimuli.  48  Taken together, these fi ndings would allow the possibility that such 
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may also be plausible. Therefore, we claim that recognition of the neuroscien-
tifi c fact that pain  can occur in a particular organism is a necessary and suffi cient 
condition to afford that organism basic moral consideration and respectful treat-
ment, that is to say, to avoid the purposeful infl iction of pain when and where 
possible. This is consistent with a number of ethical traditions that base human 
action on premises of nonharm and/or some version of a “golden rule” maxim 
(“do unto others . . .”) that begins from a presumption that said others can experi-
ence “hurt” in ways similar or analogous to the way(s) that humans know it.  49,50,51  
To take this argument a step further, the obligation to exercise such consider-
ation refl ects a view that is derived from the existential vulnerability of painient 
nonhuman animals and that positions them as the subjects of human responsi-
bility and care.  52,53,54  
 Ryder’s Painism Redux 
 In this context, we hold that Richard Ryder’s thesis of “painism” offers a number 
of precepts, which Ryder called “rules,” for the prevention and treatment of 
pain that may be worthwhile to a neuroethical approach to the moral regard and 
care of animals.  55  Many of Ryder’s more social assertions (about such things as 
politics, for example) have been disparaged as ampliative, and a complete descrip-
tion, discussion, and debate of Ryder’s manifesto are beyond the scope of the 
present essay.  56  However, we believe that it would be erroneous to proverbi-
ally discard the baby with the bathwater, as Ryder’s core thesis defi nes the nature 
and purpose of morality and ethics as relative and relevant to pain and the 
painient. Although his statement that pain and suffering represent the “only 
evils”  57  may be extreme when considering the human condition, a number of 
harms within the lifeworld of animals—particularly as affected by humans—
involve, or are directly or indirectly related if not attributable to pain and its 
effects. The imperative to recognize animals’ capacity to experience pain, and 
the human responsibilities that arise thereupon are obtained in Ryder’s claim 
that “moral standards should apply equally to all painient individuals, regard-
less of species . ”  58  
 From these fundamental premises follow proscriptions against the infl iction 
of “unconsented pain” and pain “for trivial purposes.”  59  We maintain that these 
support responsibility for the stewardship of both the most contemporary knowl-
edge of neural mechanisms of animal pain and the power to infl ict, prevent, 
and/or mitigate pain, which undergird the ethical treatment of animals, in 
general. Explicit to these statements is the importance of a more fi nely grained 
analysis—and revision—of the ways that animal welfare is imparted in various 
utilitarian agendas of human society. 
 Although we pose this argument as a basis for both individual refl ection and to 
contribute to guidelines and policies for the treatment of animals, we are not naïve 
to, nor do we deny, human needs and motives for fl ourishing.  60  Nor is this a call 
for strict veganism, the abandonment of animal products, or a prohibition against 
pets, zoos, and the use of service and work animals. We do not exhort extremism 
in the moral consideration and treatment of animals. But, to paraphrase scientist 
and animal welfare advocate Temple Grandin, the more science learns about ani-
mals, the more we must develop and institute sociocultural considerations of, and 
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 Pain Research Involving Animals 
 This spirit of scientifi c inquiry generates a potential conundrum: given that research 
is the principal tool that enables the articulation of science and acquisition of 
knowledge, there is a rational and defensible argument for continued studies to 
further elucidate the neurocognitive functions and capabilities of animals. Yet, the 
goals of such investigations, how such studies are undertaken, and how fi ndings 
are utilized are equally important if science is to remain ethically sound. Pain 
research involving animals provokes particular ethical discussion and controversy 
because it axiomatically is intended to elicit pain in the research subject, and a full 
presentation of this discussion exceeds the limits of this article.  62  
 Animal studies also have been—and remain—important to guide and complement 
investigations involving human subjects.  63  However, a number of limitations and 
criticisms of animal models of pain have been brought to the fore, including a lack 
of ecological validity, narrow emphasis on sensory events, inadequacies when 
addressing the epidemiology of chronic pain (in both animal and human popula-
tions), and inferiority of design and reporting standards.  64  Identifying these gaps 
and inadequacies is crucial to the iterative reappraisal of the scope, conduct, and 
value of pain research in animals (if not animal research overall). Questions essen-
tial to such reappraisal refl ect the well-known “Three Rs” (reduction, revision, and 
replacement), as proposed by Russell and Burch, and ask (1) whether painful 
methods can be replaced with other, less invasive protocols, (2) if and how proto-
cols and methods can be refi ned to minimize the painful nature of the research, 
and (3) whether and how the numbers of animals—and perhaps the overall num-
ber of studies—can and should be reduced.  65  
 Furthermore, there is continued uncertainty and debate within the scientifi c 
community as to whether or not animals provide a realistic model of human 
pain.  66,67,68,69  This refl ects a type of “extrapolation dilemma”  70  that elicits two 
potential scenarios that are important to the ways that results from research studies 
are used. In scenario A, the model is “distant” and therefore, although it provides 
some information, remains “insuffi cient” for direct comparative applications due 
to differences and gaps in the structures and functions of systems studied. The 
resulting implication is that we should abandon the model in favor of others 
that are more proximate and applicable. In scenario B, the model is “proximate” 
and therefore “suffi cient” given the similarity of structures and functions of 
those systems studied to the comparative target. The resulting implication is that 
information from the model should be applied both to the comparative target 
 and to the model. If we (rightly) assume that current animal models of pain 
fulfi ll criteria of being proximate and suffi cient sources for information that may 
be directly relevant, and that may be translated to knowledge about human sys-
tems, then what is learned from studying animals—to gain information about 
humans—is applicable to both humans and (at least) those species of animals that 
are the object of study. If this is so, then the good of research could be maximized 
through the application and use of such knowledge to inform and direct subse-
quent actions toward both humans and animals. 
 From this, we posit that a foundational stance for the conduct of animal research 
and care could be derived from, and based on, a version of Rawls’s principle of 
 maximin : given (1) the unequal distribution of knowledge, capability, and power 





















































































































Sherry E. Loveless and James Giordano
168
with the anatomical and physiologic capabilities for pain will manifest this experi-
ence, then (3) ethical probity can be achieved and sustained by maximum preven-
tion and mitigation of such pain, as a minimum benefi t that should be allocated by 
those in power toward the provision of the welfare of those organisms over whom 
such power is exercised.  71  
 A Path Forward 
 We recognize the potential benefi t of pain research in animals, but here again we 
question how, and to what effect, research fi ndings will be utilized. We believe that 
in light of knowledge about pain gained from such investigations to date, contin-
ued pain research in animals is acceptable if and only if any and all such studies 
(1) adhere to practical and ethical guidelines that are consistent with the most 
contemporary understanding of comparative and cognitive neuroscience, (2) adopt 
a frank precautionary stance when the welfare of any painient creature is at risk, 
and (3) attempt to directly employ research fi ndings to benefi t animal species through 
reciprocal and/or reverse translation, writ both small, within veterinary prac-
tice, and large, as applied to the care and treatment of wild, captive, livestock, 
and domestic animals.  72  
 Although we offer painience as a minimum criterion for neuroethical regard, 
this is but a fi rst step, as we anticipate that further understanding of animal con-
sciousness, emotions, and higher cognitive functions will instantiate stricter 
moral standards for animal research and welfare. These neuroethical premises 
are not merely confi ned to the laboratory but extend into the public sphere to 
affect social conduct as well. We maintain that an important element in the social 
acknowledgement and embrace of new concepts will be the development of neu-
roethically informed and neuroethically based programs of primary, secondary, 
and postsecondary education. Such programs would inculcate more meaningful 
apprehension of the ways that neuroscience may foster a non-anthropocentric 
appreciation of animals and would strengthen the notion of human/animal 
differences as distinctions of degree, rather than natural kind, and in so doing 
weaken anachronistic dualisms that have guided human treatment of animals. 
This will be evermore necessary as (1) society becomes more neuroscientifi cally 
and technologically capable, dependent, and oriented; (2) neuroscience and 
technology become increasingly powerful forces of social construction and/or 
deconstruction; and (3) humanity confronts the growing, incumbent responsi-
bility to use such knowledge and technology in ways that are morally sound.  73  
Furthermore, neuroscientifi c information and neuroethical precepts should 
inform and infl uence policies and laws directing and governing the treatment of 
animals. 
 Although neurocentric criteria can be seen as novel and important grounds for 
animal welfare and protection legislation, the statutory protection of animals is 
not new. The fi rst formal laws to assert animal welfare were enacted in Germany 
in the late 1700s, followed in 1822 by Martin’s Law being signed into effect in 
Britain.  74  Regional German statutes during the early 1800s were superseded by 
the fi rst encompassing national animal protection law in 1871, which was strongly 
infl uenced by both the philosophical worldview and the expanding scientifi c 
empiricism of the time.  75  Ethically based, comprehensive national animal protec-
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for the German Law on Animal Protection (Reichstierschutzgesetz), fi rst passed in 
November 1933, and subsequently expanded in 1938.  76  Following the fall of the 
Third Reich, the law was amended during the 1950s and 1960s and fi nally rescinded 
in 1972, in favor of a more contemporary iteration—the Tierschutzgesetz—which 
maintained the ethical foundations of the earlier versions but entailed greater 
appreciation for the physical and psychological lives of animals and obtained a more 
balanced view of animal and human interests. Although largely rhetorical, the law 
fostered the incorporation of cohesive animal protection language into German civil 
codes and state constitutions and provided the impetus for a number of attempts at 
fortifi cation through national constitutional amendments during the mid-1990s.  77  
These efforts ultimately culminated in the 2002 addition of a clause within Article 
20a of the German constitution (viz., “ und die Tiere ,” or “and the animals”)  78  that 
ensured regard and protection of animals in the formulation and enactment of all 
laws and judicial decisions.  79  Moreover, the trend in German law since the 1970s has 
been important to animal protection statues in other European countries, including 
Austria and Switzerland.  80  And although animal protection regulations throughout 
the European Union (as well as the United States and Canada)  81  are generally not as 
extensive or stringent as in Germany,  82  the Tierschutzgesetz concept of epistemo-
logically informed, ethically based regard and treatment of animals may be seen as 
setting the stage for international regulations, such as the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, 
which amended stances on animal welfare provided by the Treaty on European 
Union, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in so doing 
established animal protection as a fundamental ethico-legal principle.  83  
 In conclusion, our aim is not to prescribe a form of neuroethical absolutism, for 
we acknowledge that individuals’ moral compasses differ, and cultural norms and 
mores vary. But ethical analysis and sound legal deliberation must begin from 
fact(s), and it is our hope that neuroscientifi c information about the painience of 
other species will dispel dated apologia for the mistreatment of animals and foster 
a sense of awareness and responsibility to inform and guide the ethical refl ections, 
choices, and actions of both individuals and societies. 
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